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NOTES 
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF STATE ETHICS 
RULES UNDER THE MCDADE AMENDMENT:  
DO FEDERAL OR STATE COURTS GET 
THE LAST WORD? 
Hopi Costello* 
 
The McDade Amendment (“the Act”) is a federal law that requires 
federal prosecutors to abide by the state ethics rules of the jurisdiction in 
which they practice.  The Act does not say, however, whether federal or 
state courts are definitive when it comes to interpreting state ethics rules as 
they apply to federal prosecutors.  Those testifying before Congress raised 
this issue and noted that the Act left the issue unresolved.  Despite this, 
Congress did not address this matter in either its legislative history or in 
the Act itself.  No court has tackled this question and scholarship attends to 
it only in passing.  At this time, both federal and state courts interpret state 
ethics rules as they apply to federal prosecutors. 
As it currently stands, with both court systems interpreting the rules and 
no determination as to which is definitive, federal prosecutors must comply 
with both federal and state court interpretations.  This is likely to chill 
federal prosecutors in the exercise of their official duties because they are 
bound to be unsure of the rules they must abide by.  More importantly, 
concurrent interpretation creates unsolvable conflicts when a federal and 
state court in the same jurisdiction interpret the same rule differently. 
This Note explores whether federal or state courts’ interpretations of 
state ethics rules are definitive as applied to federal prosecutors under the 
McDade Amendment.  It considers the plain text of the Act, its legislative 
history, and the purposes and policies of the legislation.  Ultimately, this 
Note argues that the legal community should regard state courts’ 
interpretations as definitive.  This Note concludes by proposing a 
framework for federal courts to defer to state courts’ interpretations of 
ethics rules as they apply to federal prosecutors. 
 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2016, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2010, Macalester 
College.  I owe my deepest gratitude to Professor Bruce A. Green for his invaluable 
feedback, his steady guidance, and his enviable expertise.  I would also like to thank my 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, the Kentucky Bar Association (KBA) promulgated an ethics 
advisory opinion finding that the use of ineffective assistance of counsel 
waivers (“IAC waivers”) in plea agreements violates both prosecutors’ and 
defense attorneys’ ethical obligations under the Kentucky Rules of 
Professional Conduct.1  The KBA prohibited all prosecutors practicing in 
 
 1. See Ky. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. E-435 (2012).  The majority of state ethics boards that 
have considered the issue have reached the same conclusion.  For an in-depth analysis of 
state ethics boards’ opinions regarding IAC waivers, see Peter A. Joy & Rodney J. Uphoff, 
Systemic Barriers to Effective Assistance of Counsel in Plea Bargaining, 99 IOWA L. REV. 
2103 (2014).  For a detailed analysis of the situation in Kentucky specifically, see Michelle 
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the state, including federal prosecutors, from requesting or requiring such 
waivers as part of a plea agreement.2  For the following two years, federal 
prosecutors ignored the KBA’s opinion and continued to include IAC 
waivers in plea agreements.3  They did so even though federal legislation 
referred to as the McDade Amendment4 (or, “the Act”) requires federal 
prosecutors to abide by state ethics rules in the jurisdiction where they 
practice.5  The United States Attorneys argued that the KBA’s opinion 
conflicted with federal law, which allows IAC waivers.6  The federal 
prosecutors also claimed that “the KBA’s opinion was an unreasonable 
interpretation of the ethics rules.”7  Additionally, the KBA’s opinion was 
only advisory.8 
In 2014, the Supreme Court of Kentucky intervened.9  The state’s highest 
court concluded that, under the McDade Amendment, federal prosecutors 
must abide by the KBA’s prohibition of IAC waivers in plea agreements.10  
The Kentucky Supreme Court reached this conclusion by interpreting a 
number of state ethics rules.  Nowhere do the Kentucky ethics rules 
explicitly prohibit IAC waivers; rather, the state court read certain ethics 
rules as prohibiting this particular attorney conduct.11 
After the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision, federal courts in that 
jurisdiction had a choice of whether to accept plea bargains that included 
IAC waivers.  Federal courts could either defer to the state court’s 
interpretation of the ethics rules that IAC waivers were not allowed or 
decide on their own whether IAC waivers breached attorneys’ ethical 
duties.  Federal courts in Kentucky avoided having to make this choice 
because soon after the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision, former-
Attorney General Eric Holder (“AG Holder”) announced that federal 
 
Harrison, Under Attack:  The De-Legitimization of State Ethics Rules in the Face of 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 521 (2014). 
 2. See Ky. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. E-435 at 1. 
 3. See, e.g., Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1–2, United States v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 439 
S.W.3d 136 (Ky. 2014) (No. 2013-SC-000270), 2013 WL 4736435, at *1 (arguing that the 
KBA opinion should be vacated). 
 4. The McDade Amendment was enacted with the Citizens Protection Act and has the 
subtitle “Ethical standards for attorneys for the Government.” See 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2012).  
This Note refers to the amendment as both the “McDade Amendment” and “the Act.”  For 
an explanation of the Act, see infra Part I.A.3. 
 5. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B. 
 6. See Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 3, at 1.  The majority of the federal 
appellate courts hold that IAC waivers are enforceable as long as they are knowing and 
voluntary.  For a discussion of the federal courts’ opinions, see Nancy J. King, Plea 
Bargains That Waive Claims of Ineffective Assistance—Waiving Padilla and Frye, 51 DUQ. 
L. REV. 647, 651–55 (2013). 
 7. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 1. 
 8. See Howland W. Abramson & Gary Lee, Judicial Ethics Advisory Committees 
Should Render Opinions Which Adhere to Binding United States Constitutional Precedents, 
41 DUQ. L. REV. 269, 269 n.1 (2003) (“[S]uch judicial ethics advisory opinions are not 
binding . . . .”). 
 9. See United States v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d 136 (Ky. 2014). 
 10. See id. at 157–58. 
 11. See id. at 152–57. 
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prosecutors would no longer seek IAC waivers.12  This effectively mooted 
the issue in Kentucky.13 
However, it is inevitable that this issue will arise again, with different 
prosecutorial conduct and different state ethics rules.  When it does, the 
federal court will have to decide whether to defer to the state court’s 
interpretation of the ethics rule or to interpret the rule itself.  The answer to 
how federal courts should proceed in this scenario depends on whether 
federal courts’ or state courts’ interpretations of state ethics rules are 
definitive under the McDade Amendment. 
The McDade Amendment requires federal prosecutors to follow state 
ethics rules.14  However, the Act does not say whether federal prosecutors 
must also abide by state courts’ interpretations of those rules.15  Currently, 
both federal and state courts interpret state ethics rules as they apply to 
federal prosecutors.16  Therefore, the question arises:  Must federal courts 
defer to state courts’ interpretations of ethics rules or may they interpret 
these rules themselves?  Put another way, do federal courts or state courts 
get the last word when it comes to interpreting state ethics rules as they 
apply to federal prosecutors under the McDade Amendment? 
This question was discussed when the McDade Amendment was enacted, 
but it has not been resolved.17  In a hearing before the House of 
Representatives, Seth Waxman, then-Associate Deputy Attorney General, 
explicitly asked, “Whose interpretation of the bar rules will count for 
purposes of enforcement?”18  Waxman pointed out that the Act did not 
address this question.19  He stated, “[T]he bill leaves [this question] open, 
and confused.”20  Waxman went on to say, “These are not easy questions.  I 
raise them not because I have the answers, but because the answers are 
necessary to any consideration of this bill.”21  There was no further 
 
 12. See Joe Palazzolo, Government Rethinks Waivers with Guilty Pleas, WALL STREET. 
J. (Sept. 26, 2014, 12:19 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/u-s-government-seeks-to-curb-
appeals-over-bad-legal-advice-1411745218 [http://perma.cc/P7VR-CMJ3]. 
 13. Although unlikely, Kentucky could still bring disciplinary proceedings against 
United States Attorneys who included IAC waivers in plea agreements prior to AG Holder’s 
announcement because there is no statute of limitations on attorney discipline. See 7A C.J.S. 
Attorney & Client § 125 (2004) (“General statutes of limitations are not applicable to 
disciplinary proceedings.”). 
 14. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2012).  For a detailed explanation of the Act, see infra Part 
I.A.3. 
 15. See infra Part II.A. 
 16. See infra Part I.B. 
 17. See infra Part II.B. 
 18. Ethical Standards for Federal Prosecutors Act of 1996:  Hearing on H.R. 3386 
Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. of the 
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 47 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 Legislative Hearings] (statement of Seth 
P. Waxman, Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice). 
 19. See id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
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discussion on this point.22  No court has resolved this question and the 
academic literature has addressed it only in passing.23 
Federal prosecutors can either abide by the state court ethics rules as 
interpreted by state courts or they can abide by these rules as interpreted by 
federal courts.  As it stands now, with no answer as to which interpretation 
is definitive and both court systems interpreting the rules, federal 
prosecutors must abide by both.  This has the potential to create irresolvable 
conflicts.  Having to abide by two sets of interpretations is likely to chill 
federal prosecutors in the exercise of their official duties and confusion over 
which rules to follow will hinder them in prosecuting to the fullest extent of 
the law.24  Additionally, there is no solution for when federal and state 
interpretations clash.  Therefore, it is imperative that the legal community 
regard either federal or state courts as the definitive source for judicial 
interpretation of ethics rules as they apply to federal prosecutors under the 
McDade Amendment. 
This Note explores the puzzle of whether federal or state courts’ 
interpretations of ethics rules are definitive under the McDade Amendment.  
Part I describes how federal prosecutors are regulated in general and under 
the McDade Amendment and illustrates that both federal and state courts 
interpret state ethics rules.  Part II lays out the problems with federal and 
state courts interpreting the same ethics rules and explores the arguments in 
favor of both regarding federal and state courts’ interpretations as 
definitive.  Part III argues that, considering the underlying purposes and 
policies of the McDade Amendment, federal courts should defer to state 
courts’ interpretations of state ethics rules. 
I.  REGULATING FEDERAL PROSECUTORS:  
ETHICS RULES AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS 
There is a long history of ethical regulation of attorneys in the United 
States.25  The American Bar Association (ABA) first adopted ethics 
regulations, called the Cannons of Professional Ethics, in 1908.26  Since 
then, the ABA, states, and federal courts have all participated in the ethical 
regulation of attorneys, including federal prosecutors.  This section 
discusses how federal prosecutors are regulated, both through ethics rules 
and through judicial interpretations of these rules.  First, Part I.A discusses 
the ethics rules that apply to federal prosecutors.  Next, Part I.B describes 
how both federal and state courts interpret these rules as they pertain to 
federal prosecutors. 
 
 22. See id. 
 23. See sources cited infra note 198. 
 24. Cf. infra notes 223–27 and accompanying text (explaining that this was the case 
before Congress enacted the McDade Amendment because federal prosecutors were 
similarly unsure of which interpretations of ethics rules applied to them). 
 25. See generally David Ray Papke, The Legal Profession and Its Ethical 
Responsibilities:  A History, in ETHICS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 35, 36 (Michael Davis & 
Frederick A. Elliston eds., 1986). 
 26. See id. at 47. 
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A.  Regulating Federal Prosecutors Through Ethics Rules 
This section explains the number of mechanisms that regulate federal 
prosecutors.  Part I.A.1 briefly discusses the general framework for 
regulating attorney ethics as it existed before the McDade Amendment and 
as it still exists separate from the Act.  Part I.A.2 describes the historical 
background that led to the McDade Amendment.  Finally, Part I.A.3 
explains the McDade Amendment and how it changed the ethical regulation 
and obligations of federal prosecutors. 
1.  Attorney Ethics Regulation Separate from the McDade Amendment 
In the United States, state courts primarily regulate attorneys.27  For 
example, state courts admit lawyers to the bar, create attorney ethics rules, 
and discipline attorneys who do not comply with their rules.28  For the most 
part, state courts adopt rules promulgated by the ABA, or at least rely on 
these rules in crafting their own regulations.29  State courts generally have a 
single code of ethics rules that regulates attorney conduct.30  States’ ethics 
authorities may discipline attorneys who violate these rules while practicing 
within the state.31 
Federal courts also regulate attorney conduct.  Unlike most state courts,32 
“federal courts have no uniform or focused approach” to regulating attorney 
ethics.33  Rather, federal courts do so through a variety of methods.34  These 
methods fall into two main categories:  First, federal courts may enact rules 
governing attorney conduct.  Second, federal courts regulate attorney ethics 
through common law decision making.35 
Federal courts may promulgate ethics rules for attorneys practicing in 
federal court.36  This includes federal prosecutors.37  Despite federal courts’ 
authority to develop rules of conduct for attorneys appearing before them, 
federal courts primarily regulate their attorneys through state ethics rules.38  
For instance, federal district courts largely adopt state courts’ ethics rules 
into their own local court rules.39  The extent to which federal courts adopt 
 
 27. See Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors and Professional Regulation, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 873, 875 (2012) (“Regulation of the bar in the United States has principally been the 
province of state courts . . . .”). 
 28. See id. 
 29. See id. at 875–76. 
 30. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors’ Ethics, 
55 VAND. L. REV. 381, 400 (2002). 
 31. See id. at 391 n.17. 
 32. See supra text accompanying note 30. 
 33. Green & Zacharias, supra note 30, at 400. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See Judith A. McMorrow & Daniel R. Coquillette, The Federal Law of Attorney 
Conduct, in MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 8, § 801.02 (3d ed. 2006). 
 36. See Green, supra note 27, at 875. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See id. See generally McMorrow & Coquillette, supra note 35, § 8. 
 39. As of 2006, eighty-four of the ninety-four federal district courts had adopted the 
state ethics rules of the jurisdiction in which they are located into their local rules. See 
McMorrow & Coquillette, supra note 35, § 802.02[1].  Conversely, as of 2010, only six 
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state ethics rules differs among courts.40  Some district courts adopt 
wholesale the standards of the state in which the district court is located, 
including any future changes made by the state.41  Others adopt the state 
standards only as they exist at a fixed point in time.42  Still others adopt 
certain state ethics rules but do not adopt them all.43  In addition, states 
have authority to apply their own ethics rules to federal attorneys who work 
within their borders.44  Therefore, even though federal courts have authority 
to promulgate rules for their own district, in practice the state ethics rules 
are often in effect. 
Important for the purposes of this Note is how federal courts that adopt 
state ethics rules approach judicial interpretation of those rules.  Some such 
federal district courts view themselves as free to interpret the state ethics 
rules when there is no state authority directly on point.45  In these districts, 
if a state court has interpreted the rule in a prior case, the federal court feels 
constrained “to exercise Erie style deference to state authority.”46  On the 
other hand, if the state court has not interpreted the rule, the federal court 
will interpret the rule itself.47 
However, the majority of federal district courts that have adopted state 
ethics rules do not take this approach.48  Rather, when adopting state ethics 
rules, most federal district courts do not also adopt the state courts’ 
interpretation of these rules.49  Some federal district courts adopt the state 
ethics rules but in doing so plainly state that they reserve the right to 
interpret these rules themselves.50  Other federal courts explicitly state that 
they are adopting only the state’s ethics rules.51 
Therefore, before Congress enacted the McDade Amendment, deciding 
which court system should interpret state ethics rules in a particular federal 
court would have been an easy inquiry.  The only information required was 
whether the federal district court had adopted the state rules and, if so, 
 
district courts had adopted no state ethics rules. See id. § 801.02 (citing the Western District 
of Wisconsin as an example, where ethical issues are dealt with “on an ad hoc basis with 
complete discretion in the judge . . . ”). 
 40. See McMorrow & Coquillette, supra note 35, § 801.02 (explaining that “some 
federal courts have adopted very few rules, or none at all, governing attorney conduct” and 
that others essentially adopt the state rules wholesale). 
 41. See id. § 802.02[1]. 
 42. See id. § 802.02[2]. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 30, at 391 & n.17 (citing Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Johnson, 770 A.2d 130, 148 (Md. 2001), as an example). 
 45. See McMorrow & Coquillette, supra note 35, § 802.02[1]. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See, e.g., S.D.N.Y. R. 1.5 (specifying that the federal court will use the state rules 
exclusively as “interpreted and applied by the United States Supreme Court, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and this court”). 
 51. See W. DIST. PA. R. 83.3 (explicitly adopting only the state rules). 
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whether it had also adopted the state’s interpretation of those rules.52  Under 
the McDade Amendment, though, this question becomes complicated.53 
Federal courts also regulate federal attorneys, including federal 
prosecutors, through common law decision making.54  One way federal 
courts do this is by “deciding issues in individual cases in a way that signals 
the court’s view of appropriate conduct.”55  For example, if a federal judge 
believes an attorney misbehaved in a particular case, he may “dismiss [the] 
case, exclude evidence, instruct the jury in a way benefitting the defense, or 
make other trial and pretrial rulings that respond to the prosecutorial 
conduct.”56  Federal courts also issue ethics rules through common law 
adjudication by punishing or criticizing individual attorneys.57  Judges both 
criticize attorneys in written opinions and admonish them off the record.58  
2.  The Lead-Up to the McDade Amendment 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a series of events brought the issue of 
regulating federal prosecutors to the national stage.  Two separate 
controversies erupted, both over the ethical oversight of federal prosecutors.  
First, the Department of Justice (DOJ) attempted to exempt itself from 
certain ethics rules through internal memoranda and federal regulations.59  
Second, Congressman Joseph McDade was criminally prosecuted on 
allegations of bribery-related conduct,60 and he publically criticized the 
ethical behavior of the federal prosecutors on his case.61  Both of these 
controversies motivated Congress to enact the McDade Amendment.62  For 
the purposes of this Note, only the DOJ’s attempts to exempt itself from 
ethics regulations are particularly relevant.63 
Starting in 1980, the DOJ and state ethics authorities began to express 
disagreement regarding the “no-contact rule.”64  The no-contact rule is a 
longstanding ethics regulation that prohibits attorneys from contacting 
 
 52. See supra text accompanying notes 38–51. 
 53. See infra Part II. 
 54. See McMorrow & Coquillette, supra note 35, § 801.02; see also Green & Zacharias, 
supra note 30, at 401–05. 
 55. Green & Zacharias, supra note 30, at 401. 
 56. Id. at 401–02 nn.74–77 (citing examples of each). 
 57. See id. at 404. 
 58. See id. (citing examples). 
 59. See infra notes 64–90 and accompanying text. 
 60. See United States v. McDade, No. 92-249, 1992 WL 151314, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 
19, 1992) (federal grand jury indicting the congressman on five counts). 
 61. See Michael deCourcy Hinds, Top Republican on a House Panel Is Charged with 
Accepting Bribes, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/06/us/top-
republican-on-a-house-panel-is-charged-with-accepting-bribes.html [http://perma.cc/X6EP-
VPQC]. 
 62. See infra Part I.A.3. 
 63. The full history of Congressman McDade’s criminal prosecution, and his complaints 
over the federal prosecutors who worked on it, are beyond the scope of this Note.  For a 
recounting of this history, see Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of 
Federal Prosecutors, 88 GEO. L.J. 207, 211–12 (2000). 
 64. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2004). 
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represented parties without their lawyers’ consent.65  In 1980, the DOJ 
Office of Legal Counsel distributed a memorandum stating that federal 
prosecutors did not violate the no-contact rule by contacting witnesses and 
suspects, without their lawyers’ knowledge, before formal adversarial 
proceedings began, if done in accordance with DOJ policy.66  In support of 
its position, the DOJ pointed out that the no-contact rule permits contact 
with represented parties if “authorized by law.”67  The DOJ claimed that it 
had authority to adopt regulations that were a “reasonable and necessary 
means to effectuate” the U.S. Attorney’s statutorily imposed duty68 to 
“prosecute . . . all offenses against the United States.”69  According to the 
DOJ, this was one such regulation and authorized the otherwise-prohibited 
contacts.70 
In 1988, in United States v. Hammad,71 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit questioned the legitimacy of the DOJ’s position.  In 
Hammad, the federal court adopted the no-contact rule through its local 
rulemaking process.72  The defendant claimed that the DOJ violated the rule 
when it directed an informant to contact him without his attorney’s 
knowledge or consent.73  Although the Second Circuit admitted the 
evidence obtained in this manner,74 the court held that the no-contact rule 
was applicable to criminal investigations, including pre-indictment 
contacts.75  The appellate court recognized that, in certain circumstances, 
the use of an informant would be allowed under the “authorized by law” 
exception.76  However, the court declined to explain the exact scenarios in 
which the no-contact rule would allow these contacts.77  Therefore, 
Hammad created uncertainty as to the rules applying to federal prosecutors 
who engaged in undercover contacts of represented parties and as to the 
consequences of violating these rules. 
Attorney General Richard Thornburgh (“AG Thornburgh”) responded to 
the uncertainty created by Hammad by circulating an internal memorandum 
 
 65. The current no-contact rule is Model Rule 4.2. See id.  The predecessor rule was DR 
7-102.  See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1969).  This 
Note refers to both as the “no-contact rule” and cites to the rule that was in effect at the time 
of the source or history it is discussing. 
 66. See Ethical Restraints of the ABA Code of Prof’l Responsibility on Fed. Criminal 
Investigations, 4B Op. O.L.C. 576, 576 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 DOJ Memo]. 
 67. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104. 
 68. 1980 DOJ Memo, supra note 66, at 582. 
 69. 28 U.S.C. § 547(1) (2012). 
 70. See 1980 DOJ Memo, supra note 66, at 576. 
 71. 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 72. See id. at 837. 
 73. See id. at 836. 
 74. See id. at 842. 
 75. See id. at 838. 
 76. See id. (finding that there was “no principled basis in the rule to constrain its reach” 
to post-indictment contacts). 
 77. See id. at 840 (“Notwithstanding requests for a bright-line rule, we decline to list all 
possible situations that may violate [the no-contact rule].”). 
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to all DOJ attorneys.78  The memo purported to exempt DOJ attorneys from 
the no-contact rule, as well as from ethics rules limiting prosecutors’ ability 
to subpoena witnesses.79  AG Thornburgh stressed that broad 
interpretations of the no-contact rule would have a “substantial burden on 
the law enforcement process” by restricting the government’s routine 
contact with witnesses and use of undercover investigations.80  The memo 
promised to challenge state disciplinary proceedings against federal 
prosecutors who engaged in these contacts “on Supremacy Clause 
grounds.”81 
In 1994, Attorney General Janet Reno (“AG Reno”) promulgated formal 
regulations (“the Reno Regulation”) continuing the exemption of federal 
prosecutors from the no-contact rule.82  Through the Reno Regulation, 
federal prosecutors were allowed to formally exempt themselves from state 
ethics rules, creating a special and distinct set of rules applicable only to 
them.83  The DOJ claimed that the Supremacy Clause sanctioned this 
preemption of state ethics rules84 and invoked separation of powers to argue 
that federal courts may not adopt or apply state rules to federal 
prosecutors.85  However, AG Reno did state that the DOJ would voluntarily 
comply with most professional rules.86 
The DOJ’s actions drew much attention from the media and scholars 
alike.87  Additionally, numerous lawsuits challenged the DOJ’s Supremacy 
Clause and separation of powers arguments.88  Congress considered taking 
action in 199089 but instead warned the DOJ of future congressional 
oversight.90 
 
 78. See Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Richard L. Thornburgh to all Justice Dep’t 
Litigators 1 (June 8, 1989), reprinted in In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 489 (D.N.M. 1992) 
[hereinafter Thornburgh Memo]. 
 79. See id. at 489, 493. 
 80. See id. at 489, 492. 
 81. Id. at 489, 493. 
 82. 28 C.F.R. § 77 (1994) [hereinafter Reno Regulation].  For an explanation of the 
Reno Regulation, see Communications with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,910 
(1994). 
 83. See generally Reno Regulation, supra note 82. 
 84. See id. at 39,916. 
 85. See id. at 39,917. 
 86. See id. at 10,086 (“[F]ederal attorneys generally continue to be subject to state bar 
ethical rules where they are licensed to practice, except in the limited circumstances where 
state ethical rules clearly conflict with lawful federal procedures and practices.”). 
 87. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 63, at 213. 
 88. See, e.g., United States v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 132 F.3d 1252, 1257 (8th Cir. 
1998) (rejecting the validity of the Reno Regulation); United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 
1461 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting the claim that “general enabling statutes” legitimized the 
DOJ’s definition of which contacts were “authorized by law”); see also Zacharias & Green, 
supra note 63, at 213 (citing and describing cases challenging the DOJ’s separation of 
powers arguments). 
 89. See H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, Fed. Prosecutorial Authority in a Changing 
Legal Environment:  More Attention Required, H.R. REP. NO. 101-986, at 32 (1990) (“We 
disagree with the Attorney General’s attempts to exempt departmental attorneys from 
compliance with the ethical requirements adopted by the State bars to which they belong and 
in the rules of the Federal courts before which they appear.”). 
 90. See id. at 36. 
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3.  The McDade Amendment:  
What It Is and How It Regulates Federal Prosecutors 
In 1996, Congress took steps toward this threatened oversight.  
Congressman McDade introduced a bill in the House of Representatives to 
increase ethical regulation of federal prosecutors.91  This bill would 
eventually become the McDade Amendment.92  Congressman McDade 
introduced the legislation several times before Congress finally enacted it.93  
Additionally, the Congressman introduced multiple versions of the bill, 
with differing provisions regulating federal prosecutors, before Congress 
enacted it in its current form.94  Eventually, in 2000, the bill was enacted as 
the Act that regulates federal prosecutors today.95 
The McDade Amendment provides, “An attorney for the Government 
shall be subject to State laws and rules, and local Federal court rules, 
governing attorneys in each State where such attorney engages in that 
attorney’s duties, to the same extent and in the same manner as other 
attorneys in that State.”96  In effect, the Act requires federal prosecutors to 
“play by” the ethics rules of the state in which they practice.97  The Act also 
requires federal prosecutors to abide by local federal court rules.98 
The purpose of the McDade Amendment was to subject federal 
prosecutors to heightened ethical regulation,99 motivated by the then-recent 
controversies over the ethical behavior of federal prosecutors100 and 
Congressman McDade’s personal experience with federal prosecutors.101  
But in a larger sense, the Act was a response to the DOJ’s attempts to 
exempt its attorneys from the no-contact rule.102  Witnesses who testified 
on the bill before the House of Representatives made this clear.103  The Act 
 
 91. See H.R. 3386, 104th Cong. (1996). 
 92. 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2012). 
 93. The full history of the McDade Amendment’s enactment is beyond the scope of this 
Note.  For this history, see Green & Zacharias, supra note 63, at 214–15. 
 94. The substance of the proposed versions of the McDade Amendment are also beyond 
the scope of this Note.  For more information on these alternative versions of the Act, see id. 
 95. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See id. 
 98. See id. 
 99. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 63, at 215 (stating that the Act was “intended to 
regulate federal prosecutors more stringently and to limit their powers”); cf. 1996 Legislative 
Hearings, supra note 18, at 10 (statement of Rep. Joseph McDade) (“The power of 
prosecutors is tremendous and the problem of misconduct is serious.”). 
 100. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 101. See 1996 Legislative Hearings, supra note 18, at 7 (statement of Rep. Joseph 
McDade) (referring to his “firsthand knowledge of the overzealousness and excessiveness of 
[f]ederal prosecutors”).  A detailed analysis of how Congressman McDade’s own criminal 
prosecution influenced his legislation is beyond the scope of this Note.  For more 
information on this topic, see Green & Zacharias, supra note 63, at 214–15. 
 102. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 63, at 214 (explaining that witnesses who 
testified on the bill in the House “focused on the Reno [Regulation] and its effect on state 
ethics provisions forbidding contacts with represented persons . . . ”). 
 103. See 1996 Legislative Hearings, supra note 18, at 60 (statement of Tim Evans, Dir., 
Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers) (describing the bill as “a much needed, long overdue 
measure to reign in professed self-policing prosecutors run amuck, and to end the reign of 
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prohibits federal prosecutors from exempting themselves from ethics 
rules,104 as the DOJ did with the no-contact rule.105  The Act rejects the 
idea that federal prosecutors should be subject to a distinct and specialized 
ethics regime.106  Rather, the Act requires that federal prosecutors abide by 
the same ethics rules as all other attorneys in the state.107  In this way, the 
idea that federal prosecutors are not unique and do not require specialized 
ethical regulation is central to, and implicit in, the Act.108 
Prior to the McDade Amendment, federal prosecutors were already 
required to heed state ethics rules in two scenarios.109  First, federal 
prosecutors were required to follow state ethics rules if the federal court had 
adopted them into their local rules.110  Second, a state could hold a federal 
prosecutor to its rules when that prosecutor performed work within the 
state.111  The McDade Amendment did away with the need for a federal 
court to adopt the state rules or for work to be performed in the state in 
order for federal prosecutors to be bound by state rules.112  Instead, under 
the McDade Amendment, all federal prosecutors are bound by the state 
ethics rules of the jurisdiction where they practice.113  The framework for 
regulating federal prosecutors that existed prior to the McDade 
Amendment114 is still intact.  For example, federal courts may still enact 
their own rules governing federal attorneys115 and may still adopt the state’s 
ethics rules.116  The McDade Amendment adds to this framework, rather 
than replacing it. 
The McDade Amendment’s directive that federal prosecutors follow state 
ethics rules does nothing to change the fact that federal prosecutors are 
bound by the rules of federal procedure and federal substantive law.117  The 
 
prosecutorial imperialism begat by the roundly condemned ‘Thornburgh Memorandum’ of 
June 1989”); id. at 96–97 (testimony of Roger Pilon, CATO Institute) (“[H]owever prudent 
the [Reno Regulation] may or may not be, it is presumptuous at least for the department to 
be telling the rest of us that it and it alone will set the rules for the conduct of its attorneys.”). 
 104. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2012). 
 105. See supra notes 64–86 and accompanying text (explaining the controversy over the 
no-contact rule). 
 106. See supra note 103 (citing legislative history to this effect); see also supra notes 64–
86 and accompanying text (explaining the history of the DOJ’s treatment of the no-contact 
rule that led Congress to enact the McDade Amendment). 
 107. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B. 
 108. See supra notes 64–107 and accompanying text. 
 109. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 110. See supra notes 39–44 and accompanying text. 
 111. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 112. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B. 
 113. See id. 
 114. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 115. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 116. See supra notes 39–44 and accompanying text. 
 117. See 28 C.F.R. § 77.1(b) (1999) (stating that the McDade Amendment “should not be 
construed in any way to alter federal substantive, procedural, or evidentiary law”); 28 C.F.R. 
§ 77.2(h)(1) (defining the phrase “state laws and rules and local federal court rules governing 
attorneys” as it is used in the McDade Amendment as excluding “any statute, rule, or 
regulation which does not govern ethical conduct, such as rules of procedure, evidence, or 
substantive law”). 
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Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution mandates this by dictating that 
the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States “shall be the 
supreme law of the land.”118  In practice, the Supremacy Clause invalidates 
state laws that “interfere with, or are contrary to,” federal law.119  Because 
federal rules of procedure and substance do not fall under the McDade 
Amendment,120 federal prosecutors must follow these federal rules and not 
state rules that interfere with them.121  Therefore, if a rule governs ethics, it 
binds federal prosecutors under the McDade Amendment and the 
Supremacy Clause is not implicated.122  However, if the rule is substantive 
or procedural and inconsistent with a federal rule, the Supremacy Clause 
mandates that federal prosecutors follow only the federal rule.123 
Very few cases have interpreted the McDade Amendment.124  One 
question that courts have addressed is whether federal prosecutors are 
bound by every rule in a state’s ethics code, just by virtue of it being 
labeled an “ethics rule.”125  Federal courts have said they are not.126  As 
explained above, federal prosecutors are not bound by state procedural 
rules.127  Federal courts have concluded that a rule may be procedural in 
 
 118. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 119. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824). 
 120. See 28 C.F.R. § 77.1; 28 C.F.R. § 77.2(h)(1); see also sources cited supra note 117. 
 121. See United States v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d 136 (Ky. 2014). 
 122. See United States v. Colo. Supreme Court, 189 F.3d 1281, 1284 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 123. See id. 
 124. A total of thirty-six reported cases cite to the McDade Amendment.  This includes 
federal and state court cases at all levels, but cases that were appealed are only counted once. 
See Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009); In re Auerhahn, 724 F.3d 103 (1st Cir. 
2013); United States v. Lopez-Avila, 678 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Williams, 698 F.3d 374 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Carona, 660 F.3d 360 (9th Cir. 
2011); United States v. Brown, 595 F.3d 498 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Olson, 450 
F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2006); Augustine v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, 429 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 
2005); United States v. Whittaker, 268 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Plumley, 
207 F.3d 1086 (8th Cir. 2000); Stern v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. Of Mass., 214 F.3d 4 
(1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Talao, 222 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2000); Colo. Supreme Court, 
189 F.3d 1281; United States v. Condon, 170 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. 
Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th 
Cir. 1999); Cox v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 213 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2012); United States v. 
Koerber, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Utah 2013); United States v. Binday, 908 F. Supp. 2d 
485 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); In re Telfair, 745 F. Supp. 2d 536 (D.N.J. 2010); SEC v. Lines, 669 F. 
Supp. 2d 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); United States v. Syling, 553 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (D. Haw. 
2008); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 533 F. Supp. 2d 602 (W.D.N.C. 2007); In re Lucas, 317 
B.R. 195 (D. Mass. 2004); United States v. Bowman, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1239 (N.D. Ala. 
2003); In re Chan, 271 F. Supp. 2d 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); United States v. Dwyer, 287 F. 
Supp. 2d 82 (D. Mass 2003); United States v. Grass, 239 F. Supp. 2d 535 (M.D. Pa. 2003); 
N.Y. Bar Ass’n v. F.T.C., 276 F. Supp. 2d 110 (D.D.C. 2003); United States v. Reid, 214 F. 
Supp. 2d 84 (D. Mass. 2002); United States v. Acosta, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (E.D. Wis. 
2000); Mendoza Toro v. Gil, 110 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.P.R. 2000); United States v. Medina, 41 
F. Supp. 2d 38 (D. Mass. 1999); United States v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d 136 (Ky. 
2014); In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d 352 (Mass. 2008); State ex rel. York v. W. Va. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel, 744 S.E.2d 293 (W. Va. 2013). 
 125. See, e.g., Colo. Supreme Court, 189 F.3d 1281; Stern, 214 F.3d 4. 
 126. See Stern, 214 F.3d at 20 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 77.2(h)(1), which states that the 
applicability of the McDade Amendment does not depend on “whether or not [the state] rule 
is included in a code of professional responsibility for attorneys”). 
 127. See supra notes 117–23 and accompanying text. 
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nature even though it is adopted as an ethics rule and published in an ethics 
code.128  For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
concluded that a rule limiting the ability of prosecutors to subpoena lawyers 
for information on their clients, “though doubtless motivated by ethical 
concerns, ha[d] outgrown those humble beginnings” and become, in 
substance, a procedural rule.129  Federal courts are clear that rules such as 
these—that appear to be ethics rules but are really procedural in nature—do 
not apply to federal prosecutors under the McDade Amendment.130  These 
decisions reflect an understanding that “[s]ubstance, not form, must 
control.”131 
However, courts have not addressed the issue of whether federal or state 
court interpretations of ethics rules are definitive under the McDade 
Amendment.  Although no court has discussed this issue, both federal and 
state courts interpret state ethics rules as they apply to federal prosecutors. 
B.  Judicial Interpretation of Ethics Rules Under the McDade Amendment 
Despite the McDade Amendment’s clear directive that federal 
prosecutors must abide by state court ethics rules,132 the Act says nothing 
about whether federal or state courts’ interpretations of such rules are 
definitive under the Act.133  Therefore, both state and federal courts 
currently interpret state ethics rules as they apply to federal prosecutors.134  
As a threshold matter, if a rule is not an ethics rule (for example, if it is a 
procedural or substantive rule), federal courts have ultimate interpretive 
authority.135  This section discusses judicial interpretation of state ethics 
rules as they apply to federal prosecutors.  Part I.B.1 begins by illustrating 
that federal courts interpret these ethics rules.  Part I.B.2 then shows that 
state courts also interpret ethics rules as they apply to federal prosecutors. 
1.  Federal Courts Interpret State Ethics Rules 
As They Apply to Federal Prosecutors 
Federal courts frequently interpret state ethics rules as they apply to 
federal prosecutors.136  The no-contact rule137 is one ethics provision that 
 
 128. See Stern, 214 F.3d at 20–21; Colo. Supreme Court, 189 F.3d at 1287–88 
(developing a test to determine if a rule is procedural or ethical). 
 129. Stern, 214 F.3d at 20. 
 130. See id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2012); see also supra Part I.A.3 (explaining the Act). 
 133. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B; see also infra Part II.A (explaining that the plain text of the 
Act does not state which courts’ interpretations are final). 
 134. See infra Part I.B.1–2. 
 135. See supra notes 117–23 and accompanying text. 
 136. See, e.g., United States v. Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119, 1121 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(interpreting a Florida ethics rule stating lawyers shall not “fabricate evidence, counsel or 
assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness”); United States v. 
Syling, 553 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1190–91 (D. Haw. 2008) (discussing whether federal 
prosecutors have an ethical obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury); In 
re Grand Jury Subpoena, 533 F. Supp. 2d 602, 607–10 (W.D.N.C. 2007) (interpreting a 
North Carolina professional conduct rule providing circumstances where a prosecutor may 
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federal courts have repeatedly interpreted.138  For example, in United States 
v. Lopez,139 the U.S Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit interpreted 
California’s version of the no-contact rule as it applied to a federal 
prosecutor.  Rule 2-100 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State 
Bar of California, the state’s equivalent of the no-contact rule, prohibits a 
member of the California State Bar from communicating with represented 
parties without their counsel’s consent.140  In Lopez, the prosecutor, Lyons, 
had met with a represented defendant to discuss the possibility of a plea 
deal without the defendant’s lawyer present and without the lawyer’s 
knowledge or consent.141  The Ninth Circuit concluded that Lyons breached 
his ethical duties under Rule 2-100 by doing so.142 
The Ninth Circuit had to interpret Rule 2-100 in order to determine if 
Lyons breached it.  For instance, the court interpreted the rule as imposing 
an ethical obligation on a prosecutor “at the latest upon the moment of 
indictment.”143  In addition, Rule 2-100 contains an exception for 
“communications otherwise authorized by law.”144  The federal court 
interpreted that exception as not applying to Lyons’s conduct.145  The Ninth 
Circuit explained that federal statutes permitting prosecutors to 
communicate with represented parties in order to detect and prosecute 
federal offenses did not come under the “authorized by law” exception.146  
Rather, the court interpreted the “authorized by law” exception to Rule 2-
100 as “requir[ing] that a statutory scheme expressly permit contact 
between an attorney and a represented party.”147  The court stated that the 
federal statutes the government pointed to as authorizing the 
communication were “nothing more than general enabling statutes.”148 
 
subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury proceeding to present evidence about a past or present 
client); see also Federal Prosecutors, State Ethics Regulations, and the McDade 
Amendment, Note, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2080, 2092–93 (2000) (noting that federal courts 
interpret state ethics rules) [hereinafter Harvard Note]. 
 137. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.2 (1983); see also supra notes 64–90 and 
accompanying text (discussing this rule and how it relates to the history of the McDade 
Amendment). 
 138. See, e.g., United States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941, 955–56 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 
(interpreting the no-contact rule as not requiring a prosecutor to refrain from communication 
with represented parties prior to their indictment); see also Grievance Comm. for the S. Dist. 
of N.Y. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640 (2d Cir. 1995) (interpreting the no-contact rule); United 
States v. Lopez, 989 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1993) (same); In re Chan, 271 F. Supp. 2d 539 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (same); In re Searer, 950 F. Supp. 811 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (same). 
 139. 989 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 140. See CA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2-100(A) (“While representing a client, a 
member shall not communicate directly or indirectly about the subject of the representation 
with a party the member knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the 
member has the consent of the other lawyer.”). 
 141. See Lopez, 989 F.2d at 1034–35. 
 142. See id. at 1041. 
 143. Id. at 1038. 
 144. CA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2-100(C)(3). 
 145. See Lopez, 989 F.2d at 1038–39. 
 146. See id. 
 147. Id. at 1039. 
 148. See id. 
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Rule 2-100 is not unambiguous on its face.  For instance, it only applies 
where the lawyer “knows” the party is represented, the party must be 
represented “in the matter” at issue, and there is an exception for conduct 
that is “authorized by law.”149  These terms and others in the rule are vague, 
such that that they require judicial interpretation in order to be applied.  
Lopez illustrates that federal courts undertake this interpretation as it applies 
to federal prosecutors.   
2.  State Courts Interpret State Ethics Rules 
As They Apply to Federal Prosecutors 
State courts also interpret state ethics rules as they apply to federal 
prosecutors.150  As an example, consider the Kentucky Supreme Court’s 
decision151 discussed above.152  Recall that the KBA held in an advisory 
opinion that IAC waivers in plea agreements violate both defense attorneys’ 
and prosecutors’ ethical obligations under the state’s ethics rules.153  As 
such, the KBA banned IAC waivers.154 
As to the defense attorney, the KBA found that advising a client on 
whether to sign an IAC waiver violates two provisions of the Kentucky 
ethics rules.155  First, the rules state, “[A] lawyer shall not represent a client 
if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest”156 and define 
a concurrent conflict of interest as creating “a significant risk that the 
representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by . . . a 
personal interest of the lawyer.”157  The KBA found such a conflict of 
interest when a defense attorney advises a client on whether to sign an IAC 
waiver.158  The KBA explained that a defense attorney is personally 
interested in the client signing the IAC waiver because she has a personal 
interest in preventing a court from finding that she was ineffective.159  In 
addition, a successful IAC claim is a prerequisite to a malpractice suit in the 
state of Kentucky.160  As such, the KBA concluded that defense counsel 
 
 149. CA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2-100. 
 150. See, e.g., United States v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d 136 (Ky. 2014) (state supreme 
court interpreting state ethics rule against waivers of ineffective assistance of counsel in plea 
agreements as they apply to united states attorneys practicing in the jurisdiction); In re 
Howes, 940 P.2d 159 (N.M. 1997) (interpreting the state’s no-contact rule as prohibiting an 
investigator from speaking with a defendant without his lawyer’s consent where the 
defendant initiated the communication); In re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966, 974–76 (Or. 2000) (state 
court interpreting state ethics rule to forbid all lawyers, including federal prosecutors, from 
using deceit in investigations). 
 151. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d 136. 
 152. See supra notes 1–11 and accompanying text. 
 153. See Ky. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. E-435 (2012); see also supra notes 1–2 and 
accompanying text. 
 154. See Ky. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. E-435; see also supra notes 1–2 and accompanying 
text. 
 155. See Ky. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. E-435 at 2. 
 156. KY. ST. S. CT. R. 3.130(1.7)(a). 
 157. Id. 3.130(1.7)(a)(2). 
 158. See Ky. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. E-435 at 2. 
 159. See id. 
 160. See id. 
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advising on an IAC waiver violates the state’s rule161 prohibiting 
agreements that prospectively limit a lawyer’s liability to a client for 
malpractice.162 
The KBA also found that prosecutors violate the Kentucky ethics rules 
by including IAC waivers in plea agreements.163  The state ethics rules 
prohibit an attorney from inducing or assisting another to breach the 
rules.164  As explained above, the KBA concluded that a defense attorney 
breaches her ethical duties by advising on an IAC waiver.165  Therefore, the 
KBA found, by including or requiring such a waiver, the prosecutor induces 
or assists the defense attorney to violate the ethics rules.166  In addition, 
comments to the Kentucky ethics rules state that “[a] prosecutor has the 
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”167  
The KBA concluded that a prosecutor breaches his duty to act as a 
“minister of justice” when he includes an IAC waiver in a plea 
agreement.168  Because the KBA concluded that IAC waivers violate the 
Kentucky ethics rules, it prohibited all prosecutors practicing in the state, 
including federal prosecutors, from requesting or requiring them as part of a 
plea agreement.169 
The United States Attorney’s Offices for the Eastern and Western 
Districts of Kentucky (“the USAO”) asked the Kentucky Supreme Court to 
review the ethics opinion.170  The USAO argued that it was not bound by 
the KBA’s opinion under the McDade Amendment.171  The Kentucky 
Supreme Court disagreed with the USAO and found instead that federal 
prosecutors must comply with the KBA’s opinion.172 
In reaching this conclusion, the state supreme court interpreted the state 
ethics rules as they applied to federal prosecutors.173  Specifically, it 
interpreted the state’s conflict of interest rule as prohibiting defense 
attorneys from advising on IAC waivers.174  The state supreme court also 
interpreted the state’s rule against limiting malpractice liability as 
prohibiting defense counsel from discussing an IAC waiver with her 
client.175  Further, the Kentucky Supreme Court interpreted the state’s rule 
prohibiting lawyers from inducing or assisting others to violate the ethics 
 
 161. KY. ST. S. CT. R. 3.130(1.8)(h). 
 162. See Ky. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. E-435 at 2. 
 163. See id. at 3. 
 164. See KY. ST. S. CT. R. 3.130(8.4)(a). 
 165. See supra notes 155–62 and accompanying text. 
 166. See Ky. Bar Ass’n Ethics Op. E-435 at 3. 
 167. KY. ST. S. CT. R. 3.130(3.8), cmt. 1. 
 168. See Ky. Bar Ass’n Ethics Op. E-435 at 3. 
 169. See id. at 1. 
 170. See Brief for Respondent, United States v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d 136 (Ky. 
2014) (No. 2013-SC-000270), 2013 WL 8610407, at *2 (stating that the USAO sought 
review of the KBA’s opinion and asked that the Kentucky Supreme Court vacate it). 
 171. See Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 3, at *1–2. 
 172. See Ky. Bar Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d 136. 
 173. See id. 
 174. See id. at 151–55. 
 175. See id. at 155–56. 
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rules as disallowing prosecutors from requesting IAC waivers.176  Finally, it 
read Kentucky’s rule stating that prosecutors are “minister[s] of justice” to 
preclude prosecutors from including IAC waivers in plea agreements.177 
It is clear that state ethics rules contain ambiguities178 and require 
judicial interpretation in order to be applied.179  In United States v. 
Kentucky. Bar Ass’n,180 the state supreme court provided this 
interpretation.181  Nowhere do the Kentucky ethics rules explicitly prohibit 
IAC waivers.182  Rather, the state supreme court interpreted ambiguous 
ethics rules as prohibiting this specific attorney conduct.183  In short, the 
Kentucky Supreme Court interpreted the state’s ethics rules, as the KBA 
had, as prohibiting IAC waivers.184 
In September 2014, the DOJ effectively mooted the issue of attorney 
ethical obligations surrounding IAC waivers in plea agreements.  Then-AG 
Holder announced that federal prosecutors would no longer seek IAC 
waivers in plea agreements.185  Going forward, federal prosecutors will not 
seek IAC waivers because of internal DOJ policy.186  Prior to this, though, 
federal prosecutors in Kentucky could not have sought IAC waivers under 
the Kentucky Supreme Court’s interpretation of the state ethics rules.187 
II.  THE ULTIMATE AUTHORITY TO INTERPRET STATE ETHICS RULES AS 
THEY APPLY TO FEDERAL PROSECUTORS:  ARE FEDERAL COURTS’ OR 
STATE COURTS’ INTERPRETATIONS DEFINITIVE? 
As the proceeding sections show, both federal and state courts interpret 
state ethics rules as they apply to federal prosecutors.188  If state courts are 
the definitive source of interpretation of ethics rules as they apply to federal 
prosecutors, then federal prosecutors must abide by the state rules as 
interpreted by state courts.  If federal courts’ interpretations are definitive, 
then federal prosecutors must abide by the state rules, as interpreted by 
federal courts.  However, as it currently stands, with both court systems 
interpreting the rules and no authority on which is definitive, federal 
prosecutors must abide by both state court and federal court interpretations 
of state ethics rules. 
 
 176. See id. at 157. 
 177. See id. 
 178. See, e.g., KY. ST. S. CT. R. 3.130(8.4(a)) (“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer 
to:   . . . knowingly assist or induce another [attorney] to . . . violate or attempt to violate the 
Rules of Professional Conduct . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 179. See, e.g., Ky. Bar Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d at 157 (interpreting the words “knowingly” and 
“induce” in the ethics rules). 
 180. 439 S.W.3d 136 (Ky. 2014). 
 181. See id. at 151–57. 
 182. See KY. ST. S. CT. R. 1–9. 
 183. See Ky. Bar Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d at 151–57. 
 184. See id. at 157–58. 
 185. See Palazzolo, supra note 12. 
 186. See id. 
 187. See Ky. Bar Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d at 157–58. 
 188. See supra Part I.B.1–2. 
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This is a recipe for insanity for at least two reasons.  First, the need to 
abide by two courts’ interpretations of ethics rules is likely to chill federal 
prosecutors in performing their official duties.  With both federal and state 
courts interpreting ethics rules, federal prosecutors are bound to be 
uncertain of which courts’ interpretations apply to them.189  Uncertainty 
over their ethical obligations is likely to hinder federal prosecutors’ ability 
to effectively perform their jobs because they may not take action for fear 
of being sanctioned.190 
Second, the conflict over interpretation is most pronounced where a 
federal and a state court in the same jurisdiction disagree over the 
interpretation of the same ethics rule.  For example, consider a hypothetical.  
Imagine that a federal district court in Kentucky has reached the opposite 
conclusion from the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision discussed above 
concerning IAC waivers191:  the state court has interpreted the state ethics 
rules as prohibiting IAC waivers,192 but the federal court has interpreted the 
same rules as allowing them.  In this way, imagine that the state supreme 
court and the district court in the same jurisdiction have reached opposing 
interpretations of the same state ethics rules.  Federal prosecutors cannot 
comply with both interpretations—one allows them to include IAC waivers 
in plea agreements but the other prohibits them from doing so.  Which 
court’s interpretation prevails in this situation? 
The answer depends on the McDade Amendment.193  If being “subject to 
State laws and rules . . . governing attorneys in each State where such 
attorney engages in that attorney’s duties”194 includes state courts’ 
interpretation of those rules, then the state court’s interpretation reigns.  If, 
however, this language does not include state courts’ interpretations of 
ethics rules, but only the rules themselves, then federal courts are the 
definitive source for interpreting the state rules as they apply to federal 
prosecutors.195  No court has addressed this question.  Although it was 
 
 189. Cf. infra note 224 and accompanying text (explaining that federal prosecutors were 
confused as to which interpretations of the ethics rules applied to them before the McDade 
Amendment was enacted and that the Act was meant to remedy this confusion). 
 190. Cf. infra notes 223–27 and accompanying text (describing that this was the case 
before the McDade Amendment was adopted and that the legislation was enacted in part to 
address this issue); cf. Harvard Note, supra note 136, at 2093 (explaining the same 
phenomenon where prosecutors are unsure of whether a federal or state ethics rule applies). 
 191. See supra notes 172–84 and accompanying text. 
 192. See supra notes 172–84 and accompanying text. 
 193. 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2012). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Of note, however, is that, in the case of Kentucky, a clever district court could have 
dodged the issue of whether federal or state courts’ interpretations of state ethics rules are 
definitive.  A federal judge could have found that she must defer to state court interpretations 
of ethics rules as they apply to federal prosecutors under the McDade Amendment but noted 
that she is not required to defer to state court interpretations of the rules as they apply to 
federal defenders because the Act only pertains to federal prosecutors.  The judge would 
then not be required to defer to the state court’s finding that IAC waivers breach defense 
attorneys’ ethical obligations.  If the defense attorney breached no ethical duty, the 
prosecutor would not have breached his duty not to induce or assist others in violating the 
ethics rules.  If the court so found, the state court’s prohibition of IAC waivers would not 
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raised when the McDade Amendment was enacted,196 this issue was not 
solved in the legislative history or text of the Act.197  The scholarship 
addresses this question only in passing.198 
This section explores the question of which court system’s interpretation 
is definitive, presenting the arguments in favor of both federal and state 
court interpretation.  First, Part II.A discusses how the plain text of the 
McDade Amendment does not address the question of judicial 
interpretation in any meaningful way.  Second, Part II.B illustrates how the 
legislative history also fails to resolve this issue.  Finally, Part II.C lays out 
the policies and purposes of the McDade Amendment and discusses how 
they may help to answer the question of judicial interpretation. 
A.  The Plain Text of the McDade Amendment 
The McDade Amendment reads: 
(a) An attorney for the Government shall be subject to State laws and 
rules, and local Federal court rules, governing attorneys in each State 
where such attorney engages in that attorney’s duties, to the same extent 
and in the same manner as other attorneys in that State.  (b) The Attorney 
General shall make and amend rules of the Department of Justice to 
assure compliance with this section.199 
As seen in the text, the Act does not explicitly answer the question of 
interpretation.200  The Act does not say whether federal or state courts are 
definitive for purposes of interpretation of the ethics rules.201  In fact, the 
 
apply to federal prosecutors even if the federal court deferred to the state court generally on 
matters of ethics interpretation. 
 196. See supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text. 
 197. See supra Part II.A–B. 
 198. There has been very little scholarly discussion on this subject and virtually no in-
depth treatment.  A handful of scholars have assumed, without discussion, that state courts 
have the ultimate authority to interpret state ethics rules.  However, these scholars mention 
this assumption in passing, do not explore the issue in any detail, and do not offer a reason 
for their assumption. See J. Nick Badgerow, Honor in Battle:  The Conflict Between Candor 
and Zealous Advocacy, 70-OCT J. KAN. B.A. 16, 21 (2001) (“Thus, under the McDade 
Amendment, all government lawyers must comply with the rules of ethics applicable in the 
state(s) where they practice.  This would include the state’s interpretation and application of 
the no-contact provisions of Rule 4.2.” (emphasis added)); Megan Browdie & Wei Xiang, 
Note, Chevron Protects Citizens:  Reviving the Citizens Protection Act, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 695, 696 (2009) (“[A] proper construction of the [McDade Amendment] requires 
district courts to rely on state interpretations and remedies when applying that state’s ethics 
rules to federal prosecutors.” (emphasis added)); Rima Sirota, Reassessing the Citizens 
Protection Act:  A Good Thing It Passed, and a Good Thing It Failed, 43 SW. L. REV. 51, 
75–76 (2013) (“Both [McDade Amendment] supporters and opponents expected that the 
new law would subject federal prosecutors to state interpretations of the no-contact rule—
just like ‘other attorneys in that State’—and that state law would narrow or eliminate the 
availability of the pre-charge investigatory exemption.” (emphasis added)). 
 199. 28 U.S.C. § 530B. 
 200. See id. 
 201. See id. 
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Act makes no clear mention of judicial interpretation whatsoever.202  
Further, the plain text can be read in at least two different ways.203 
On the one hand, the McDade Amendment can be read as favoring state 
court interpretation.  The Act requires federal prosecutors to comply with 
the state ethics rules “to the same extent and in the same manner as other 
attorneys in that State.”204  Other attorneys in the state205 are required to 
abide by the state court’s interpretations of the rules.  Therefore, the 
language requiring federal prosecutors to follow the state ethics rules “to 
the same extent as . . . other attorneys in that State”206 may include a 
requirement that federal prosecutors abide by state court interpretations.  
Under this reading of the Act, the text implicitly renders state courts 
definitive for purposes of interpreting state ethics rules as they apply to 
federal prosecutors. 
On the other hand, an argument may be made that the Act is silent as to 
judicial interpretation.  The portion of the text stating that federal 
prosecutors are subject “to the same extent and in the same manner as other 
attorneys in that State”207 can be read to attach only to the earlier portion of 
the text requiring federal prosecutors to abide by “State . . . rules.”208  
Under this reading, the text may be said to require only that federal 
prosecutors follow the rules to the same extent as other attorneys in the 
state, but to be silent as to interpretation. 
The plain text of the McDade Amendment does little to answer the 
question of whether federal or state courts are the ultimate source of 
interpretation under the Act.  The Act does not explicitly address this 
issue.209  Moreover, that the text can be read in multiple ways210 suggests 
that it is not a meaningful source to answer the question of interpretive 
authority. 
B.  The McDade Amendment’s Legislative History 
Moving beyond the plain text, the McDade Amendment’s legislative 
history also does not answer whether Congress intended federal or state 
courts to be the definitive source of ethics rule interpretation.  The 
legislative history shows that the issue was raised in Congress in the debate 
over whether to enact the McDade Amendment.211  Despite this, the issue 
was not resolved, either by members of Congress while debating the Act212 
 
 202. See id. 
 203. See infra notes 204–08 and accompanying text. 
 204. 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. (emphasis added). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. (emphasis added). 
 209. See id. 
 210. See supra notes 204–08 and accompanying text. 
 211. See infra notes 215–34 and accompanying text. 
 212. See infra notes 215–34 and accompanying text. 
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or in the Act itself.213  In fact, those testifying before Congress explicitly 
remarked that the McDade Amendment left the issue of judicial 
interpretation open and unsolved.214 
There are multiple references to interpretation of ethics rules generally in 
the McDade Amendment’s legislative history.215  For example, in 
explaining why the DOJ adopted the Reno Regulation,216 a spokesman for 
the Department explained that broad judicial interpretations of the no-
contact rule interfered with law enforcement’s ability to carry out its official 
duties.217  On the other side of the debate, proponents of the Act argued that 
it was necessary because the DOJ had interpreted the no-contact rule itself 
so as not to apply to federal prosecutors and the DOJ should not have this 
authority.218  These proponents of the Act explained that allowing those 
who are governed by a rule to interpret it “renders the rule meaningless” 
and that the manner in which the DOJ had interpreted the rule “displays an 
arrogant disregard for . . . ethics in the legal profession.”219 
Beyond debate about interpretation of ethics rules generally, the 
legislative history also includes discussion over the inherent problems with 
conflicting state and federal court interpretations of ethics rules.220  Those 
opposed to the Act explained that the DOJ’s concern over differing 
interpretations of ethics rules by federal and state courts221 motivated it to 
promulgate the Reno Regulation.222  For instance, Seth P. Waxman, then-
Associate Deputy Attorney General, testified before the House that, prior to 
the McDade Amendment’s enactment, federal and state courts interpreted 
no-contact rules differently.223  Waxman stated that prosecutors were left 
uncertain as to which courts’ interpretation would be enforced against 
 
 213. See supra Part II.A (explaining that the plain text of the McDade Amendment does 
not address this issue). 
 214. See infra note 233 and accompanying text. 
 215. See generally 1996 Legislative Hearings, supra note 18. 
 216. 28 C.F.R. § 77 (1994).  For an explanation of the Reno Regulation, see supra notes 
82–86. 
 217. See 1996 Legislative Hearings, supra note 18, at 13 (statement of Seth P. Waxman, 
Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice) (“[T]he expansive application of the contacts 
rule in some jurisdictions has threatened legitimate and essential law enforcement 
activities.”); accord Communications with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,911 (Aug. 
4, 1994) (explaining that broad interpretations of the no-contact rule in some states chilled 
prosecutors in the exercise of their duties). 
 218. See 1996 Legislative Hearings, supra note 18, at 62 (statement of Tim Evans, Dir., 
Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers). 
 219. Id. (quoting U.S. Dist. J. Juan Burciaga). 
 220. See 1996 Legislative Hearings, supra note 18, at 14 (statement of Seth P. Waxman, 
Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice). 
 221. See id. 
 222. 28 C.F.R. § 77 (1994). 
 223. See 1996 Legislative Hearings, supra note 18, at 14 (statement of Seth P. Waxman, 
Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice) (“Federal prosecutors are facing conflicting 
interpretations of contacts regulations by various State and Federal authorities.  For example, 
while the Federal courts have almost uniformly held that the contacts rules have no 
application to pre-indictment noncustodial communications, some State courts have reached 
the opposite conclusion.”); accord Communications with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. 
39,911 (Aug. 4, 1994) (explaining that “state courts and state bar organizations have varied 
widely in their interpretation of the scope” of the no-contact rules). 
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them.224  This uncertainty, Waxman claimed, chilled prosecutors in the 
execution of their official duties.225  Waxman explained that the DOJ issued 
the Reno Regulation226 to free federal prosecutors from confusion over 
whether to follow federal or state court interpretations of the no-contact 
rule.227 
These statements make clear that interpretation of ethics rules was raised 
as a potential issue before Congress while debating the McDade 
Amendment.228  Further, they show that the issues surrounding conflicting 
federal and state court interpretations of state ethics rules were raised during 
the debate.229  Judicial interpretation of ethics rules was a part of the 
conversation over the McDade Amendment.230  Despite this, the issue of 
whether federal or state court interpretation would be definitive under the 
Act was not resolved in these debates.231 
Moreover, those testifying before Congress explicitly stated that the 
McDade Amendment left the issue of judicial interpretation unresolved.  
The DOJ complained that, under the Act, federal and state courts would 
both interpret ethics rules as they applied to federal prosecutors.232  Even 
more explicit is Waxman’s statement: 
[T]he bill leaves open, and confused, the question of 
enforcement . . . .  Whose interpretation of the bar rules will count for 
purposes of enforcement?  These are not easy questions.  I raise them not 
 
 224. See 1996 Legislative Hearings, supra note 18, at 14 (statement of Seth P. Waxman, 
Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice) (referring to “[t]he uncertainty resulting from 
these and other conflicting decisions”). 
 225. See id. (“The uncertainty resulting from these and other conflicting decisions hinder 
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 227. 1996 Legislative Hearings, supra note 18, at 14 (statement of Seth P. Waxman, 
Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice) (“Under this regime, the Attorney General was 
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interpretations of those rules” (emphasis added)); id. at 39,928–29 (stating that the purpose 
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of interpretations given to that rule and analogous rules by state and federal courts”). 
 228. See supra notes 215–27 and accompanying text. 
 229. See supra notes 220–27 and accompanying text. 
 230. See supra notes 220–27 and accompanying text. 
 231. See generally 1996 Legislative Hearings, supra note 18. 
 232. See Communications with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,927 (stating that, 
under the Act, it would be “left to the various state and federal district courts to interpret 
[ethics] rules and determine on their own whether they had been violated in any particular 
case”). 
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because I have the answers, but because the answers are necessary to any 
consideration of this bill.233 
There was no further discussion on this point.234  Therefore, while the 
legislative history shows that those testifying on the Act raised the issue of 
judicial interpretation, it does not indicate any congressional intent as to 
which court system has ultimate interpretive authority under the Act.235 
C.  The Purposes and Policies of the McDade Amendment 
Unlike the plain text and legislative history of the McDade Amendment, 
which do little to answer the question over judicial interpretation of state 
ethics rules,236 the underlying purposes and policies of the Act provide 
guidance on this issue.  This section describes the arguments in favor of 
both federal and state court interpretation based on the purposes and 
policies of the Act.  Part II.C.1 explains how the primary purposes of the 
McDade Amendment suggest that state courts’ interpretations of ethics 
rules should be definitive as they apply to federal prosecutors.  Part II.C.2 
describes how federal prosecutors are unique as compared to state 
prosecutors and why this supports federal court interpretation.  Finally, Part 
II.C.3 lays out why state courts’ expertise in ethics regulation weighs in 
favor of state court interpretation.  
1.  The Underlying Purposes of the McDade Amendment 
Support State Court Interpretation 
The primary function of the McDade Amendment is to make federal 
prosecutors subject to state ethics rules.237  Rules, however, mean little in 
our common law system standing alone.238  Rather, rules get their meaning 
from judicial interpretation.239  One may argue that making federal 
prosecutors subject to state ethics rules, but not states’ interpretations of 
those rules, ignores the centrality of judicial interpretation to the meaning of 
rules in our common law system. 
Further, under the McDade Amendment, federal courts may not trump 
state ethics rules with their own ethics regulations for federal 
prosecutors;240 rather, the state rules govern.241  If federal courts have 
definitive interpretive authority, they may adopt ethics rules for federal 
 
 233. 1996 Legislative Hearings, supra note 18, at 47 (statement of Seth P. Waxman, 
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 234. See generally id. 
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 237. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2012); see also supra Part I.A.3 (explaining the Act). 
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prosecutors through their opinions.242  This would effectively allow federal 
courts to supersede state ethics rules with their own rules for federal 
prosecutors.243  One may argue that allowing federal courts to essentially 
create rules through interpretation contradicts the McDade Amendment’s 
prohibition on federal courts trumping state courts’ ethics rules for federal 
prosecutors.244 
Moreover, allowing federal courts to definitively interpret the rules may 
be inconsistent with the McDade Amendment’s attempt to make federal 
prosecutors subject to the same ethics regulations as all attorneys.245  
Congress enacted the McDade Amendment in response to the Reno 
Regulation,246 under which federal prosecutors had exempted themselves 
from certain ethics rules and created a specialized set of regulations 
applicable only to them.247  Through the McDade Amendment, Congress 
prohibited this behavior.248  Congress bound federal prosecutors to the 
same ethics rules as all other attorneys.249  In so doing, Congress rejected 
the idea that federal prosecutors require a special set of ethics rules.250 
Federal courts’ interpretations of state ethics rules are generally not 
definitive.251  One may argue that if federal courts are allowed to 
definitively interpret state ethics rules as they apply to federal prosecutors—
where they do not definitively interpret state ethics rules as they apply to 
other attorneys—federal prosecutors are not truly subject to the same ethics 
rules as all other attorneys.  Rather, under such a framework, federal 
prosecutors alone are bound by federal court interpretations of the ethics 
rules.  Therefore, regarding federal courts’ interpretations as definitive may 
be contrary to the function and purposes of the Act.252 
2.  The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors 
Supports Federal Court Interpretation 
Even though the McDade Amendment rejected the idea that federal 
prosecutors require a distinct set of ethics regulations,253 there is a strong 
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argument that federal prosecutors are, in fact, unique.254  One may argue 
that allowing federal courts to definitively interpret state ethics rules 
accounts for this uniqueness while still complying with the McDade 
Amendment.255  This argument posits that federal prosecutors are unique 
from state prosecutors in multiple ways,256 federal litigation is distinct from 
state litigation,257 and federal substantive law differs from state substantive 
law.258  As a result, ethics rules apply differently to federal prosecutors than 
to state prosecutors259 and operate differently in federal court than in state 
court.260  To account for these differences, this argument suggests, ethics 
rules should be tailored to federal prosecutors and federal court.261  
However, this argument acknowledges that the McDade Amendment was 
enacted in part as a response to the Reno Regulation262 and that federal 
prosecutors should not be able to exempt themselves from ethics rules as 
they did in that instance.263  Therefore, this argument concludes that federal 
courts should tailor ethics rules through interpretation of state rules, and the 
McDade Amendment allows for this.264 
Federal prosecutors are unique from state prosecutors in at least three 
ways.265  First, as Senator Orrin Hatch emphasized when opposing the 
McDade Amendment, there are differences between the job of a federal and 
a state prosecutor.266  Senator Hatch explained that federal prosecutors 
more often work on cases involving “complex, ongoing, conspiratorial 
conduct,”267 for instance, cases of “multistate terrorism, drug, fraud or 
organized crime conspiracies . . . fraud against federally funded 
programs . . . [violations of] civil rights laws . . . complex corporate crime, 
and . . . environmental crime.”268  Second, scholars have noted “[a] related 
distinction involv[ing] the context and mechanics of federal 
prosecutions.”269  These scholars point out that federal prosecutors more 
often work across state lines, are more often personally involved in pre-
indictment investigations, and more often use grand juries than state 
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prosecutors.270  Finally, there are differences in the executive offices that 
govern federal and state prosecutors.271  Most states have multiple 
prosecutorial bodies, for instance statewide and local units, and these make 
up a fragmented collection of prosecutorial offices.272  Additionally, the 
State Attorney General’s Office usually oversees only portions of the state’s 
prosecutions.273  Therefore, no one state prosecutor’s office may speak on 
behalf of all state prosecutors.274  In comparison, the DOJ “represents the 
law enforcement authority for the entire federal executive branch” and “[i]ts 
positions are authoritative.”275 
Some argue that these distinctive qualities mean that ethics rules should 
apply differently to federal prosecutors than they do to state prosecutors.276  
For example, federal prosecutors themselves point to three ethics rules that 
hamper their ability to perform their official duties.277  First, according to 
the DOJ, the no-contact rule hinders federal prosecutors’ ability to carry out 
undercover investigations.278  Second, the DOJ argues that rules limiting 
attorney subpoenas obstruct the government’s effective use of grand 
juries.279  Third, the DOJ maintains that interpretations of ethics rules 
requiring prosecutors to share exculpatory evidence with grand juries 
interfere with the unique federal interests in grand jury proceedings.280  In 
each of these cases, the DOJ contends that the distinctive qualities of 
federal prosecutors mean that ethics rules apply more onerously to federal 
government attorneys than to state prosecutors.  Despite this, no state’s 
ethics rules distinguish between federal and state prosecutors or provide 
different rules for the two groups.281 
In addition to federal prosecutors being unique as compared to state 
prosecutors, federal litigation is different from state litigation in important 
ways.282  Some of these differences are relevant to the regulation of 
prosecutors.283  For instance, in some states, counsel may accompany a 
witness in grand jury proceedings and provide advice throughout.284  
 
 270. See id. 
 271. See id. at 241. 
 272. See id. 
 273. See id. 
 274. See id. 
 275. Id. 
 276. See, e.g., id. at 238 (explaining that the uniqueness of federal prosecutors means that 
“a restriction may be reasonable for the state’s prosecutors, while being inappropriate for 
federal prosecutors”); Green & Zacharias, supra note 30, at 426–31 (arguing that ethics rules 
apply differently to federal prosecutors in some situations); cf. Harvard Note, supra note 
136, at 2083 (“Many ethics rules hold implications for federal prosecutors that are not raised 
by their application to attorneys more generally.”). 
 277. See Harvard Note, supra note 136, at 2083–84. 
 278. See id. at 2084. 
 279. See id. 
 280. See id. 
 281. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 30, at 394. 
 282. See id. at 428–29. 
 283. See id. 
 284. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
486–87 (3d ed. 2000); see also Kathryn E. White, Note, What Have You Done with My 
228 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
Federal grand jury proceedings do not provide for this.285  The absence of 
this protection in federal court may justify additional ethical obligations for 
federal prosecutors—for example, a duty to advise the witness of the right 
against self-incrimination or to take care not to mislead the witness.286  
Additionally, federal court itself differs from state court, and these 
differences may affect ethics regulation.287  For example, differences in the 
courts’ workloads may affect how much time judges have to address ethics 
issues and how great of an interest courts have in easily applied, 
predetermined ethics rules.288 
Finally, federal substantive law differs from state substantive law.  
Substantive law and ethics regulations often interplay.289  Federal courts are 
arguably more expert on federal law than state courts.290  Moreover, state 
courts may not consider the implications ethics regulations have on federal 
substantive law.291 
The distinctiveness of federal prosecutors, federal courts, and federal law, 
and the differences in how ethics rules apply in these situations, has led 
some to argue that federal prosecutors should be regulated differently than 
other attorneys.  Importantly, some have advocated for different ethics rules 
for federal prosecutors because they are unique and because ethics rules 
apply differently to them.292  This was one of the DOJ’s reasons for the 
Reno Regulation that led to the McDade Amendment in the first place.293  
Similarly, arguments for distinct ethics regulations for federal prosecutors 
drove the opposition to the McDade Amendment in Congress.294  
Arguments that federal prosecutors should have special ethical obligations 
did not end when the McDade Amendment was enacted, though.  Rather, 
scholarly conversation continues over whether the uniqueness of federal 
prosecutors warrants a distinct set of ethics regulations for this group.295 
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Some scholars have also argued that the differences between federal and 
state court prosecutors, litigation, and substantive law mean that federal 
courts should regulate federal prosecutors.296  First, the uniqueness of 
federal prosecutors has led some scholars to argue that federal courts are 
better situated to regulate this group.297  Additionally, some scholars have 
argued that federal courts are better suited to regulate federal prosecutors in 
areas where federal litigation is distinctive because federal courts 
understand federal litigation better than state courts.298  Finally, some 
scholars argue that “[w]hen federal constitutional law or substantive federal 
law is important to the question of how federal prosecutors should be 
regulated, federal courts should be free to address the regulatory question 
independently.”299 
The view that federal prosecutors should have a distinct ethics regime 
was rejected by the McDade Amendment.300  However, one way to 
accomplish ethics rules that are tailored to the needs of federal prosecutors 
without completely doing away with the McDade Amendment may be to 
allow federal courts to interpret state ethics rules as they apply to federal 
prosecutors.  This approach keeps the McDade Amendment intact by 
applying state ethics rules to federal prosecutors.301  At the same time, it 
allows federal courts to use their expertise regarding federal prosecutors, 
litigation, and law when interpreting ethics rules and to interpret the rules 
with the uniqueness of federal prosecutors and litigation in mind.302  
Allowing federal courts definitive interpretive authority strikes a balance 
between complying with the McDade Amendment303 and accounting for 
the distinctiveness of federal prosecutors, litigation, and law.304   
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3.  State Courts’ Expertise in Ethics Supports State Court Interpretation 
While federal courts are expert in federal prosecutors, litigation, and 
law,305 state courts have “acknowledged expertise in the area of legal 
ethics.”306  One may argue that this expertise in ethics regulation means that 
state courts should be definitive for purposes of interpreting ethics rules as 
they apply to federal prosecutors.307  Further, states’ expertise in ethics 
regulation suggests that state courts are able to tailor ethics rules to account 
for the uniqueness of federal prosecutors when necessary.308 
Historically, states have always been responsible for ethics regulation.309  
Today, states remain largely in charge of regulating attorney ethics, 
including federal prosecutors’ ethics.310  States regulate attorneys, including 
federal prosecutors, in three primary ways.311  First, federal courts rely on 
state courts to determine if applicants to their bar are qualified.312  Federal 
courts do not conduct their own bar examinations or character 
investigations, but rather require attorneys appearing before them to be 
members of a state bar.313  Second, the majority of federal district courts 
adopt the ethics provisions of the states where they are located.314  Finally, 
federal courts rely on states to discipline attorneys who violate the ethics 
rules.315  State disciplinary bodies enforce ethics violations through 
proceedings for attorney sanctions and disbarment.316 
State courts are also more familiar with prosecutorial conduct than 
federal courts.317  Criminal cases are tried in state court far more frequently 
than in federal court.318  Therefore, state court judges have more 
opportunities to witness prosecutorial conduct that is subject to ethics rules 
and to see the impact of these rules on prosecutors and criminal cases.319  
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Additionally, states hold disciplinary proceedings more often, and these 
“provide another window into the need for and impact of ethics 
regulation—one that is essentially unavailable to federal courts.”320 
State courts’ expertise in ethics regulation and greater familiarity with 
attorney conduct suggests that state courts may be best situated to interpret 
state ethics rules.321  Because state courts are the authority on ethics 
regulation,322 they likely best understand ethics rules and their impact on 
the legal system.  Further, state judges’ greater familiarity with both 
prosecutorial conduct and the interplay between this conduct and ethics 
rules323 may mean that state judges are better situated to interpret the ethics 
rules as they apply to all prosecutors, including federal prosecutors. 
Moreover, if one accepts that the uniqueness of federal prosecutors 
warrants some form of specialized regulation under the ethics rules and that 
the McDade Amendment allows for this through judicial interpretation,324 
there is reason to trust that state courts, and not just federal courts, are able 
to tailor the rules to the needs of federal prosecutors.325  State courts have 
long played a central role in the ethical regulation of federal attorneys.326  
Therefore, they understand the ethics issues facing this group.327  This 
means that state courts, in addition to federal courts, are likely capable of 
interpreting ethics rules with the uniqueness of federal prosecutors in 
mind.328 
The purposes and policies underlying the McDade Amendment point in 
different directions, suggesting reasons to favor both state and federal 
courts as the final interpreter of ethics rules.329  The primary purposes of the 
Act suggest that state courts’ interpretations should be definitive.330  
Despite this, there is an argument to be made that federal prosecutors are 
unique such that the ethics rules apply differently to them and that federal 
courts can, and should, account for this uniqueness through 
interpretation.331  At the same time, state courts are expert in ethics 
regulation and attorney conduct, and there is reason to believe that state 
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courts are also able to specially tailor ethics rules for federal prosecutors 
when necessary.332 
III.  STATE COURTS SHOULD HAVE DEFINITIVE AUTHORITY TO INTERPRET 
STATE ETHICS RULES AS THEY APPLY TO FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 
State courts should be definitive when it comes to interpreting ethics 
rules as they apply to federal prosecutors.  As such, federal courts should 
defer to state courts’ interpretations of ethics rules.  This part explains why 
state courts’ interpretations should be regarded as definitive and proposes a 
framework for federal courts to defer to state courts’ interpretations. 
The plain text and legislative history of the McDade Amendment do not 
answer which court system has the final say on interpretation.333  Therefore, 
it is necessary to look beyond these sources to the policies and purposes of 
the Act.334  The policies and purpose of the McDade Amendment dictate 
that state courts are properly regarded as the authoritative interpreters of 
ethics rules as they apply to federal prosecutors. 
First, reading the McDade Amendment’s directive that federal 
prosecutors comply with state ethics rules to exclude state courts’ 
interpretations of those rules is overly formalistic.335  Such a reading 
ignores the centrality of judicial interpretation to the meaning of rules in the 
U.S. common law system.336  Although the plain text of the McDade 
Amendment only states that federal prosecutors are subject to state ethics 
rules,337 the McDade Amendment was really meant to apply entire state 
ethics regimes to federal prosecutors.338  This includes state courts’ 
interpretations of the rules in addition to the rules themselves.  To read the 
Act any other way subverts its most primary function:  to apply state ethics 
regimes to federal prosecutors.339 
Moreover, regarding federal court interpretations as definitive 
undermines the implicit assumptions of the McDade Amendment.  The Act 
responded to federal prosecutors’ attempts to exempt themselves from 
ethics rules and create a specialized set of rules applicable to only them.340  
The Act emphatically rejected this, and instead made federal prosecutors 
 
 332. See supra Part II.C.3. 
 333. See supra Part II.A (illustrating how the plain text of the Act does not answer the 
question over interpretation); supra Part II.B (explaining that the Act’s legislative history 
also does not solve this issue). 
 334. See supra Part II.C. 
 335. See supra notes 238–41 and accompanying text. 
 336. See supra notes 238–41 and accompanying text. 
 337. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2012). 
 338. See supra Part I.A.2 (explaining the historical background of the McDade 
Amendment); supra notes 99–108 and accompanying text (explaining the purpose of the 
McDade Amendment). 
 339. See supra Part I.A.3 (explaining the function and purposes of the McDade 
Amendment). 
 340. See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text (explaining that, through the Reno 
Regulation, federal prosecutors attempted to exempt themselves from ethics rules); see also 
supra notes 64–90 and accompanying text (summarizing the controversy over the DOJ and 
the no-contact rule). 
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subject to the same ethics rules as all other attorneys.341  Therefore, implicit 
in the McDade Amendment is the idea that there is nothing unique about 
federal prosecutors that requires special ethical regulations.342  Regarding 
federal courts’ interpretations as definitive as they apply to federal 
prosecutors, but not to attorneys generally,343 suggests just the opposite—
that federal prosecutors require special treatment.344  This contravenes the 
McDade Amendment’s most basic assumption.345 
Most of all, regarding federal court interpretations as definitive thwarts 
the Act’s most basic function:  to subject federal prosecutors to the same 
ethics rules as all other attorneys.346  Federal courts do not definitively 
interpret state ethics rules under ordinary circumstances.347  Allowing 
federal courts to definitively interpret the rules only as they apply to federal 
prosecutors subjects federal prosecutors to a separate and specialized set of 
ethics rules—the rules as interpreted by federal courts.348  This turns the 
McDade Amendment on its head.349 
Conversely, the only policy justification for giving federal courts the 
ultimate authority to interpret state ethics rules conflicts with the underlying 
purpose of the Act.  The primary justification for giving federal courts 
definitive interpretive power is that they have greater expertise regarding 
federal attorneys, federal litigation, and federal law.350  According to this 
justification, federal courts are therefore better able to interpret state ethics 
rules as they apply to federal prosecutors.351  This argument, however, 
assumes that ethics rules apply differently to federal prosecutors and that 
these differences should be considered when applying the rules.352  This is 
the very logic that Congress rejected in enacting the McDade 
Amendment.353  Therefore, the only justification for federal court 
interpretation must fail because it is in conflict with the spirit of the Act. 
Even if one believes that the McDade Amendment allows courts to 
consider the uniqueness of federal prosecutors when interpreting ethics 
rules,354 state courts are perfectly capable of doing so.355  There is no 
reason to think that state courts cannot make distinctions between federal 
and state prosecutors when applying ethics rules.356  In fact, state courts’ 
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expertise on attorney conduct and ethics regulation,357 and the frequency 
with which they observe prosecutorial behavior,358 suggests they are 
particularly well suited to perform this task.  Therefore, there is little merit 
to the assertion that only federal courts, with their expertise on federal 
attorneys and litigation, can appropriately apply ethics rules to federal 
prosecutors.359 
Moving beyond the purposes of the Act, there are practical reasons to 
regard state courts’ interpretations of ethics rules as definitive.  First, state 
courts have greater expertise regarding attorney ethics, and this makes state 
courts better suited than federal ones to interpret ethics rules.360  Second, 
allowing federal courts ultimate interpretive authority is impractical.  Under 
the McDade Amendment, federal courts may not make ethics rules that 
trump state ones.361  If federal courts are given definitive interpretive 
authority, a federal court may interpret an ambiguous rule so as to 
effectively change it.362  Federal courts should not be allowed to do through 
common law interpretation what they cannot do through rulemaking.  
Moreover, the McDade Amendment gives the states the ability to regulate 
attorney ethics over time.363  This is a fluid process, allowing states to 
change ethics rules as needed.364  If federal courts are given definitive 
interpretive authority, a federal court may interpret an ambiguous rule and a 
state may change that rule in response to the federal court’s interpretation.  
The state could continue to revise the rule until the federal court had no 
room to change it through its own interpretation.  Therefore, even if federal 
courts were given ultimate interpretive power, the states would still have 
the final say on ethics rules. 
In order to properly regard state courts as the definitive authority on 
ethics rule interpretation, federal courts should exercise Erie-style 
deference365 to state court interpretations, treating them as they do state law 
in diversity jurisdiction cases.366  This is presumptively a feasible 
framework, because some federal courts did exactly this before the McDade 
Amendment was enacted when adopting state ethics rules into their own 
local rules.367  It is inapposite that this was not the majority approach 
amongst courts that adopted state ethics rules.368  Before the McDade 
Amendment was enacted, this deference was not required.  However, the 
McDade Amendment changed the entire framework for regulating federal 
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prosecutors,369 and this new ethics regime requires deference to state court 
interpretations. 
When faced with an ambiguous ethics rule in a case concerning federal 
prosecutors, a federal court should apply the interpretation adopted by the 
state court in its jurisdiction.370  Where the state court has previously 
interpreted the ethics rule, the federal court should apply the state court’s 
interpretation to federal prosecutors in cases before it.371  This is the same 
principal that the Erie372 doctrine requires when a federal court hears a case 
through diversity jurisdiction:  the federal court applies state substantive 
law in matters governed by state statutes and common law.373 
Where a federal court is tasked with interpreting a state ethics rule that 
the state court in its jurisdiction has not yet interpreted, the federal court 
should similarly behave as it would in a diversity jurisdiction case.374  The 
federal court should try to ascertain how the state court would interpret the 
rule, and it should adopt this interpretation.375  As in diversity jurisdiction 
cases, in order to ascertain how the state court would rule, the federal court 
should use the sources that the state high court frequently uses to answer 
interpretive questions.376  These may include other courts’ decisions, 
restatements, academic works, treatises, and policy considerations.377  The 
federal court may also rely on trends of the state high court, for example, a 
tendency to follow majority rules.378 
This framework leaves room for courts to account for the unique role and 
needs of federal prosecutors through interpretation of the ethics rules, while 
remaining true to the McDade Amendment.  Where a federal court 
perceives that there is a difference between federal and state prosecutors, it 
may make distinctions between the two through its interpretation if the state 
court has done so or if it believes the state court would be willing to do so.  
This creates the flexibility needed to account for the uniqueness of federal 
prosecutors,379 while following the McDade Amendment’s directive that 
federal prosecutors are subject to state ethics regimes380 and honoring the 
Act’s rejection of a separate regulatory framework for federal 
prosecutors.381 
 
 369. See supra Part I.A. 
 370. Cf. Erie, 304 U.S. 64. 
 371. Cf. id. 
 372. Id. 
 373. See id. 
 374. See, e.g., Webber v. Sobba, 322 F.3d 1032 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 375. See id. 
 376. See id. 
 377. See id. 
 378. See id. 
 379. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 380. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2012); see also supra Part I.A.3. 
 381. See supra Part I.A.2–3. 
236 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
CONCLUSION 
The McDade Amendment was enacted to prevent federal prosecutors 
from playing by their own set of ethics rules.  The Act also responded to 
complaints from the DOJ that federal prosecutors were unsure of which 
ethics rules applied to them.  Therefore, the McDade Amendment made 
federal prosecutors subject to state ethics rules.  The Act left unresolved, 
however, the question of which courts—federal or state—are definitive for 
purposes of interpreting ethics rules as they apply to federal prosecutors.  
Because of this, the McDade Amendment falls short of both of its purposes.  
First, allowing federal courts to definitively interpret state ethics rules as 
they apply to federal prosecutors effectively subjects federal prosecutors to 
a separate rule regime—one made up of state rules, as interpreted by federal 
courts.  Second, it has fostered uncertainty as to which interpretations of the 
rules apply, similar to the uncertainty that the Act set out to remedy in the 
first place. 
In order to honor the spirit of the McDade Amendment and conform to 
its underlying purposes, state courts’ interpretations of ethics rules should 
be definitive as applied to federal prosecutors.  Therefore, federal courts 
should defer to state courts’ interpretations of ethics rules in matters 
regarding federal prosecutors.  Federal courts should do so by exercising 
Erie-style deference to state court interpretations.  Only by doing so will the 
purpose of the McDade Amendment be realized. 
 
